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work. It is a common problem that interventions of this type are often established with no equivalent control
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to evaluate the success of an active labour market policy (the Welsh Assembly's ‘Want2Work’ programme)
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tionmethods, sub-samples and types of job, the schemewas successful. Ourmost conservative estimate indicates
that participants were 7 percentage points more likely to ﬁnd employment than a control group of non-treated
job-seekers. The method adopted here is a useful addition to the real world policy evaluation tool kit, where
programme effectiveness needs to be judged in the absence of an established control group. Our results provide
evidence that even thosewho are currently out of the labourmarket and on health related beneﬁts canﬁndwork
with the help of appropriately designed support.
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TheWant2Work (W2W) schemewas an active labourmarket policy
that was introduced by the Welsh Assembly Government in the UK in
order to improve the chances of individuals currently out of work re-
entering the labour market. Active labour market policies have become
increasingly popular and seem particularly attractive to governments in
times of recession (Martin, 2015). This paper evaluates the W2W pilot
scheme,which ran from September 2004 until March 2008 in particular
areas of Wales.1 The primary aim of the scheme was to improve the re-
employment chances of the participants.
W2Wwas aimed at Incapacity Beneﬁt (IB) recipients; IB is a beneﬁt for
people who are unable to work due to health problems. Hence, many of
the key features of the scheme were concerned with the health status of
participants. The scheme was voluntary and advertisements detailing the
services on offer were placed in public places such as doctors' surgeries.2
The key features of the programme include a combination of mea-
sures aimed at improving the information of participants as well aswards within the Cardiff, Neath
unitary authority areas.
, non-IB claimantswanted to be
se out of work. Nevertheless, it
. This is an open access article underproviding ﬁnancial incentives. In terms of information provision, a net-
work of community-based advisers was appointed to provide advice
and guidance. In addition, a health professional was attached to each
team to support these advisors, to develop links to local health services,
and to provide information to participants as to how they could cope
with their health problems in order to participate in the labour market.
Participants also received in-work development and support during the
ﬁrst year of employment.
In termsofﬁnancial incentives, a return towork bursarywas provided,
consisting of a weekly payment to individuals to cover the costs of
returning to work. This paid £60 per week during the ﬁrst four months
in work, £40 per week in the second four months and £20 per week in
the third four-month period of the ﬁrst year in work. There was also pro-
vision of, or funding for, training, including the development of ‘soft’ skills
(such as timemanagement and communication), aswell as a job prepara-
tion premium, paid to participants to cover the cost of undertaking addi-
tional work preparation activities. Finally there was discretionary funding
available to overcome other barriers to participation in employment.
The aim of this paper is to determine whether all of these additional
services,3 over and above standard assistance to those out of work, led3 Unfortunately, the available data did not allow us to study the various aspects of the
programme separately, to determine which aspects of the scheme were most successful
in terms of getting people into work. In particular we are not able to distinguish between
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
4 The database of information onW2Wparticipants was collected by theWelsh Assem-
bly Government.
5 While W2Wwas technically in operation from Sept 2004 to March 2008 it only re-
cruited users between January 2005 and December 2007.
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lenge to be faced is common for such policy evaluations: Would the
successful participants still have obtained a job even if they had not par-
ticipated in the W2W scheme? An additional issue here is common to
many public programmes; a control group was not established as part
of the original evaluation protocol and participation in the scheme was
voluntary. To dealwith these problemsweuse propensity scorematching
(PSM) techniques to derive a statistical control group of non-participants
with similar observed characteristics to those who participate in W2W,
and then compare the employment probabilities of each group. Unlike
parametric methods used for previous similar policy evaluations, PSM
does not impose any particular functional formon the estimated relation-
ships. PSM was used for example by Brown and Taylor (2011) in their
analysis of the divergence between the reservation wages of individuals
who are out of work and their predicted market wages. The next section
reviews some other recent evaluations of active labour market policies in
theUK. The following section then describes the data andmethodology to
be used, followed by a presentation of the results. A ﬁnal section offers a
summary and some conclusions.
2. Recent evaluations of active labour market policies in the UK
In the last decade or so, a number of large-scale active labourmarket
policies have been introduced in the UK. The scheme most similar to
W2W, in terms of a focus on IB individuals, is Pathways toWork (Path-
ways). This was introduced, initially on a pilot basis in three local areas,
in October 2003, and ran until 2011. Pathways was compulsory for all
new IB claimants and was available on a voluntary basis for existing
claimants. Many of the elements were similar to theW2Wprogramme.
Various evaluations of Pathways have been undertaken. Adam et al.
(2006) used a difference-in-differences (DiD) technique to compare the
difference in the re-employment rates between pilot and non-pilot
areas before and after the introduction of Pathways. The results show
that, amongst those beginning a claim for IB, Pathways increased the
percentage in employment 101/2 months later by an estimated 9.4 per-
centage points, from a base of just 22.5%. Bewley et al. (2007) consid-
ered a longer time period, ﬁnding that Pathways increased the
probability of an initial IB claimant being in work eighteen months
later by 7.4 percentage points, from a base of 29.7% in the absence of
the policy.
Bewley et al. (2008) also considered the impact of Pathways on
existing IB claimants. A policy variation was introduced in February
2005 in that individuals living in the pilot areas with an IB claim of up
to 2 years when Pathways was ﬁrst introduced were also required to
participate in the scheme. Using a duration analysis approach, becoming
involved in Pathways reduced the probability of still being out of work
by 3.5 percentage points eighteen months later, from 97.2% to 93.7%.
Thus, the impact of the programme was signiﬁcantly reduced when
applied to those who were in the middle of an IB claim, rather than to
those at the start of their claim.
A second active labour market scheme that has attracted a lot of at-
tention is theNewDeal, and in particular theNewDeal for YoungPeople
(NDYP). This scheme was piloted in selected areas of the UK in January
1998 and rolled-out nationally in April 1998. NDYP is a compulsory
scheme for young people aged 18–24 who have been out of work for
6 months. The scheme involves an initial ‘Gateway’ period of around 4
months, where extensive job search help is provided. If the participant
fails to obtain a job in this period, they can spend up to one year in
one of four options provided by NDYP: a period of education and train-
ing; a subsidised job; a job in the voluntary sector; or work with an en-
vironmental task force.
Again, a number of evaluations of NDYP have been undertaken.
Blundell et al. (2004) conducted a DiD analysis, where the control
group consisted of individuals with similar observed characteristics in
non-pilot areas during the pilot phase, or individuals with similar ob-
served characteristics and living in the same area, but aged just over24 and so not eligible for NDYP, in the roll-out phase. The authors only
studied the impact of the initial four month Gateway period, and
found that in the former (pilot versus non-pilot) case, participating in
the Gateway increased male individuals' prospects of having moved
into employment four months after joining the Gateway by 10–11 per-
centage points, from a base of 24%.When they studied the national roll-
out using the older comparison group, the impact fell to 5 percentage
points, against a base of 26%. They attributed the fall in the size of the ef-
fect to the maturing of the scheme, and the loss of the ‘program intro-
duction effect’. Also using this second method, but considering a
longer time period, De Giorgi (2005) found that NDYP participation in-
creased the male re-employment probability after eighteen months by
4.6 percentage points, thus very similar to the estimate obtained by
Blundell et al. (2004). There was no evidence of the NDYP effect falling
further over time, as the programme matured.
Other papers have evaluated NDYP in more detail, looking at varia-
tions in the average effect. A good example is McVicar and Podivinsky
(2009) who considered whether the impact of NDYP varies across re-
gions and in particular with the tightness of their labour markets.
They used a DiD approach to duration analysis, comparing the change
in unemployment durations for 18–24 years olds before and after
the introduction of NDYP, to the similar before and after changes for
25–29 year olds who form the control group. Their results show that
NDYP reduced unemployment durations for young men in all regions,
with the size of the effect being positively, though weakly, related to
local unemployment rates, so that NDYP had a greater impact in slack
labour markets.
The evaluationmethodology to be used in this paper is PSM. Dorsett
(2001) used this approach to evaluate NDYP. All four post-Gateway op-
tionswere considered, and in each case the control group compromised
those individuals who followed one of the ‘other’ three options, as well
as those young people who remain on the Gateway longer than the four
month period without entering any of the options. For each pairwise
combination of options in turn, PSMwas used to match individuals fol-
lowing one option, to a similar person following the other. The results
showed that the subsidised employment option dominated all others
in reducing the likelihood of remaining unemployed.
3. Data and methodology
The key to a good programme evaluation is successfully estimating
the counterfactual, of what would have happened to the participants if
they had not engaged in the programme. Given that we cannot observe
participants in the non-participation state at the same point in time as
they are participating, then data on non-participants must be used to
estimate the counterfactual. It is therefore important that there is
good information available on both the treatment and control groups
(participants and non-participants), so that any differences in charac-
teristics, which may in turn have explained differences in employment
outcomes, are held constant.
Extensive data on W2W participants was collected at their point of
entry to the scheme.4 Any future changes in status, such as amovement
into employment or training, were also recorded. Anyone who joined
W2W between January 2005 and December 2007 is included, so we
have information on the full population of W2W participants between
these dates (approximately 6400 individuals).5 TheW2Wdatabase con-
tains detailed information on background characteristics, including age,
gender, ethnicity, whether a single parent or not, highest qualiﬁcation,
type of welfare beneﬁt being received when ﬁrst registered with
W2W, type of any illness or disability, and time spent out of work.
This latter is a particularly useful control variable in that it will proxy
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job during the observation period, then some characteristics of that
job are also recorded, such as annual earnings, full- or part-time status
and permanent or temporary status, as well as the date that the job
started.
The counterfactual data used for the control group are drawn from
the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for Great Britain.6 The QLFS
has a wealth of information on employment outcomes and job charac-
teristics, as well as all of the individual level characteristics that are ob-
served for theW2Wparticipants. Each quarter's sample of the QLFS has
60,000 private households made up of 5 ‘cohorts’, each in different re-
sponse ‘waves’. Therefore, in any one quarterly survey, one-ﬁfth of re-
spondents are participating for the ﬁrst time, one-ﬁfth for the second
time, etc., with one-ﬁfth being replaced each quarter. The QLFS is there-
fore a rolling panel where each cohort is interviewed in 5 successive
quarters.
Since theW2Wdata cover the period 2005 to 2007, QLFS data for the
same period were used; nine quarterly data sets for March–May 2005,
June–August 2005, and so on through to March–May 2007.7 Thus all
ﬁve appearances in the data set could be observed for ﬁve different co-
horts of QLFS respondents, the ﬁrst appearing in the QLFS for the ﬁrst
time in March–May 2005, and the last appearing in the QLFS for the
ﬁrst time in March–May 2006. The ﬁfth and last appearance of this
ﬁnal cohort was therefore March–May 2007.
Since all W2W participants were, by deﬁnition, initially out of
employment, the QLFS sample was similarly restricted, also exclud-
ing full time students and those who had taken early retirement.
Any out of work individuals participating in another active labour
market programme were also excluded from the control group. Fi-
nally, the control group was restricted to all those who responded
to the survey for the full ﬁve waves. The resulting sample consisted
of 8994 men and women aged 16–65. Of these, 3427 reported that
they wanted a job and were looking for a job. Any individual living
in one of the ﬁve pilot regions of W2W was omitted from this QLFS
control group. The analysis can therefore be seen as evaluating any
additional advantage of W2W over and above the usual provision of-
fered to unemployed and inactive individuals to help them into
work.
It would have beenuseful to restrict the control group further to spe-
ciﬁcally selected areas with similar socio-economic characteristics as
the W2W pilot areas, in order to ensure similarity between the two in
terms of job opportunities available to them.8 However, this made the
control sample unworkably small. Thus all regions of Britain other
than the W2W pilot areas were included in the control group. The un-
employment rate by travel-to-work area was included amongst the
list of conditioning variables, in order to control for differences in the
state of the local labour markets in which treatment and control group
individuals reside.
These data on the treatment and the control groups were used to
estimate the effect of W2W:
ATT ¼ E Y1i Dj i ¼ 1
 
− E Y0i Dj i ¼ 1
  ð1Þ
where ATT is the average treatment effect on the treated, Y1 is the out-
come (whether individual i ﬁnds employment) if they participate in
W2W, and Y0 is the same outcome if they do not participate. D is an in-
dicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual participates in6 Details of the samplingmethodology and questionnaires are available at http://www.
ons.gov.uk.
7 The QLFS changed from seasonal quarters to annual quarters during this period. After
this change, the annual quarters were used to reconstruct seasonal quarterly data sets, to
maintain consistency.
8 Ideally we would have liked to restrict the control group to similar areas in Wales in
order to minimise the effect of unobserved differences between the control and interven-
tion groups; the fact that we could not do this due to small sample size is a limitation of
this study.W2W and zero otherwise. Of course, the ﬁnal term in Eq. (1) cannot be
observed since this is the counterfactual of what would have happened
to theW2Wparticipants if they had not participated in the programme.
Thus, the outcome variable for the non-W2W (control) group is used
instead, so that Eq. (1) becomes:
ATT ¼ E Y1i Dij ¼ 1ð Þ − EY0i Dij ¼ 0ð Þ ð2Þ
Thus it is assumed that the outcome for the control group provides a
good estimate of the counterfactual for the treatment group. For this to
be valid, we require a conditional independence assumption to hold,
that conditional on observed variables, X, the outcome is independent
of treatment status:
Y0 ⊥ D Xj :
Thus, if we can ﬁnd individuals with the same observed charac-
teristics in both the treatment and control groups, then their out-
come in the absence of treatment would be the same. This relies
upon the X vector fully capturing the differences in characteristics
between the treatment and control groups that may also inﬂuence
the outcome variable, Y.
The propensity score, p(x), is deﬁned as the probability of an individ-
ual appearing in the treatment sample conditional on their observed
characteristics:
p xð Þ ¼ Pr D ¼ 1 X ¼ xj gf :
The propensity score can be estimated with a binary choice model
such as a probit equation. The results of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
show that conditional on the propensity score, outcomes will be
independent of treatment status:
Y0 ⊥ D pj xð Þ:
Thus, if the treated individuals can bematched to control individuals
who have the same propensity score, then the outcomes of the latter
group can be taken as an estimate of the outcomes for the former
group if they had not participated in W2W. Essentially, treated individ-
uals are being matched to individuals who look as though they would
have participated on the basis of their observed characteristics, but did
not because they live in non-W2W areas.
Two matching methods are performed, to check that results are ro-
bust to the choice of method. One approach is one-to-one, or ‘nearest
neighbour’ matching, where each individual in the treatment group is
matched to the person in the control groupwho has the closest propen-
sity score (where a ‘calliper’ or tolerance level for acceptable matches
can be set). The second approach is kernel matching, which uses a
weighted average of all observations in the control group to provide
thematch (and therefore does not throw away information), with larg-
er weights attached to observations with a closer propensity score to
the treatment group individual being considered.9 Since both estima-
tors are consistent, with a large enough sample they would produce
the same result. Any small sample bias that exists will be more preva-
lent with the kernel estimator since it uses the less closely matched
observations. Offsetting this, the kernel estimator will have a lower var-
iance, since it uses more information (see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008,
for further discussion of these points).109 The estimation was done using the psmatch2 Stata programme of Leuven and Sianesi
(2003).
10 As the results will show, the twomethods produce similar estimates of the treatment
effect, in almost every casewithin one percentage point of each other. The gain in efﬁcien-
cy fromusing the kernel estimator is alsominimal in terms of reduced standard errors, and
all estimated effects are statistically signiﬁcant anyway. There is therefore little to choose
between the two estimators, andwepresent both simply to demonstrate robustness of re-
sults to choice of matching method.
12 Very short duration jobswill not be observed in the QLFS group. If such jobs have low-
er wages, we might expect to see lower average wages for W2W participants, for whom
short duration jobs are not ruled out.
13 This time framemeans the earlyW2Wparticipants have longer to ﬁnd a job thanQLFS
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in the ﬁrst stage of the procedure, the computation of the standard
errors on the treatment effect in the second stage needs to take this
prior estimation into account. In the absence of an exact formula for
the standard errors in these circumstances, we ‘bootstrap’ the standard
errors to ascertain the degree of uncertainty attached to the result.
PSM has two advantages over traditional regression-based method-
ologies. First, it does not impose any functional form on the relationship
(compared to, for example, Ordinary Least Squares, which imposes a
linear relationship). Second, the technique identiﬁes those observations
in the treatment group for which there is no ‘common support’, i.e.,
there is nobody in the control group with a sufﬁciently similar propen-
sity score, and so no accurate way of estimating the counterfactual of
what would have happened to such an individual if they had not partic-
ipated in W2W. Observations without common support are dropped
from the evaluation.
It should be made clear that PSM was used rather than other cross-
sectional econometric techniques that can used to control for selection
into treatment, such as Instrumental Variables or the Heckman Two-
Step Estimator, due to the nature of the data available to us, rather
than due to any argument that PSM is inherently superior to such
other techniques in terms of unbiasedness or efﬁciency. In particular,
therewere no obvious instruments in our data setwithwhich to explain
selection onto the W2W programme.
Similarly, this approach was chosen, over the DiD techniques used
for example by Blundell et al. (2004) because of the nature of the avail-
able data. The information in theW2Wdatabase, described above, could
not have been evaluated using the DiDmethodology, since participants
were not observed prior to their involvement inW2W. In order tomake
use of the extensive databasemade available to us, the PSMmethod, es-
timating a cross-sectional impact at a point in time, was therefore
adopted. Thus, the evaluation has a more micro-econometric than
macro-econometric focus, concentrating on the individuals involved
rather than the whole labour market in the pilot areas.11 The question
that is being asked is therefore: ‘Are individuals more likely to ﬁnd
work by participating in W2W than if they had not participated in
W2W?’ rather than other, more aggregate questions, such as: ‘By how
much is the employment rate increased, or the inactivity rate reduced,
in the pilot areas by introducing W2W?’ that have been the focus of
other evaluations of different active labour market policies. We do,
however, use QLFS data on all out of work individuals, from before
and during the W2W pilot period, in W2W and non-W2W areas, to
answer the latter question and assess the difference in results when
this approach is taken.
4. Results
4.1. Raw data on labour market outcomes
The key indicator of success for theW2Wprogramme iswhether in-
dividualsmove into employment. Thisﬁrst section of results looks at the
rawdata on this outcome, beforemoving onto the formal evaluation. An
indicator was derived that took the value of one if individuals, in either
the treatment or control group,moved intowork at any point during the
period in which they were observed. A second indicator of labour
market outcomes, for those who ﬁnd a job, is the wage that they earn.
Banded data on earnings are available in the W2W database. With
respect to the control group, income questions are only asked of respon-
dents in their ﬁrst and ﬁnal waves in the QLFS. Since individuals in our
sample are by deﬁnition not employed in their ﬁrst wave, we can only
observe wages for respondents who have just moved into employment
in wave 5, or who moved into employment in waves 2, 3 or 4 and11 This is in contrast to an economy wide approach, such as that taken by Van Sonsbeek
and Gradus (2006) and Van Sonsbeek and Alblas (2012) in their microsimulation analysis
of a regime change in the Dutch disability scheme.remained in employment by the time of their ﬁnal, ﬁfth wave appear-
ance in the QLFS.12 This is the case for 838 individuals. Actual gross
weekly earnings are used and then converted to banded annual earn-
ings to be consistent with the W2W earnings data. Both full-time and
part-time workers are considered, so that the earnings measure picks
up the quality of job obtained in both the wage rate and hours worked
dimensions.
Table 1 compares employment and earnings outcomes for theW2W
participants and QLFS respondents. The raw data show that 30% of
W2W participants found a job at some point in the period between
them joining the scheme and the end of 2007,13 compared to only 19%
for the out-of-work QLFS respondents in the period that they were ob-
served in that survey. However, the full sample of non-employed QLFS
respondents may not be an appropriate control group. Because of the
voluntary nature of W2W, participants in that scheme have already by
deﬁnition indicated their interest and motivation in ﬁnding work. By
contrast, some of the non-employed QLFS respondents may be unable
or unwilling to work. The difference in the employment probabilities
might then be explained by this difference in the motivation to ﬁnd
work. Fortunately, the QLFS contains questions asking those of working
age who are not currently working whether they want to work and
whether they are looking for work. When the QLFS control group is re-
stricted to individuals actually wanting and looking for work, then the
proportion obtaining a job within the observed period rises to 32%, as
shown in the third row of Table 1a. Thus, without conditioning on
individual characteristics, W2W participants are slightly less likely to
have found work than job-seekers in the QLFS.
The rawdata for earnings are shown in Table 1b. It is clear that those
individuals who do obtain a job through W2W are likely to move into
low-paid work, with 90% of those who found work accepting jobs for
which they were paid less than £15,000 per year. This compares to
78% of the QLFS respondents in the control group. At the top end, signif-
icantly more QLFS respondents who found a job received in excess of
£30,000 per year, compared toW2Wparticipants, and it is such individ-
uals who cause the higher mean wage amongst QLFS relative to W2W
workers.14 On the other hand, the median wage is higher amongst the
W2W group, with the very lowest wage category covering a smaller
proportion of such workers compared to the QLFS control group.
Such raw differences in outcomes, however, ignore systematic dif-
ferences in characteristics between the two groups. Table A1 in the Ap-
pendix compares the background characteristics of the treatment and
control groups, with a separate column for the job-seekers only, in the
latter group. Looking at the differences between treatment and control
groups, as reported in the ﬁnal two columns, the data reveal that the
W2W sample are on average younger, less well-educated, more likely
to be a single parent, and less likely to be from an ethnic minority, rela-
tive to the full QLFS sample. They are more likely to have recently
worked, and less likely to have never worked at all. On average, W2W
participants live in areas with higher unemployment rates.
There is little difference between groups in the likelihood of having no
illness, which is perhaps surprising given the focus of W2W on IB claim-
ants, though in terms of type of illness, the majority of those with illness
in the W2W sample have mental health problems, whereas the QLFS
has a much higher proportion with cardio illnesses. Banks et al. (2015)
have recently documented the growing proportion of disability beneﬁt
claimantswithmental health problems; and a recent OECD report has ex-
plored the challenges in achieving higher labour market participation forrespondents, who are observed for a maximum of 15months. This fact will be considered
further in the following section.
14 Themeanwage in theW2Wsample, where only banded data are available, is estimat-
ed by an interval regression of the log of the wage band limits against a constant.
17 It is worth noting that while health problems are self-reported, reporting bias in spe-
ciﬁc health problems is likely to be less than that for overall self-reported health (Jones
et al, 2010).
18 The standardised % bias is the difference in the sample means as a percentage of the
Table 1
Labour market outcomes for the treatment and control group.
a) Employment incidence (percent)
Percentage that got a job N
Want2Work 29.8% 6424
QLFS 18.7% 8994
QLFS seeking work 31.9% 3427
b) Annual earnings (percent in each pay band)
Gross annual pay Want2Work participants QLFS
b£10,000 54.7%* 61.8%
£10,000–14,999 35.4%* 16.7%
£15,000–19,999 7.7% 8.4%
£20,000–29,999 1.7%* 7.3%
£30,000+ 0.5%* 5.8%
Mean £9508† £11,614
N 1901 838
Note: * denotes different from the QLFS at the 5% level. † estimated by an interval regres-
sion of the log of the wage band limits against a constant. QLFS is the GB Quarterly Labour
Force Survey.
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likely to be IB claimants than the QLFS control group.
When the W2W participants are compared to job-seekers only in
the QLFS control group, some of these differences between the treated
and the control group are much reduced, particularly in the case of
age and duration out of work. Overall, the job-seekers in the QLFS ap-
pear to be a more appropriate match for the W2W participants, and so
from this point onwards, the control group will be limited to those
wanting to work and looking for work.15 Nevertheless, the ﬁnal column
of Table A1 reveals that many signiﬁcant differences between W2W
participants and job-seeking QLFS respondents remain, therefore
requiring matching techniques to increase further the similarity of
treatment and control groups.
4.2. Propensity score matching estimates of the impact of W2W
Before considering the evaluation results, it is important to check the
balancing property of the PSM procedure. Table A1 revealed some signif-
icant differences in characteristics between the rawunmatched treatment
and control groups. The matched sample will be balanced if there are no
signiﬁcant differences in the means of any of the characteristics between
the treatment and control groups. Because of the concerns that the sam-
ple of W2W participants may potentially differ compared to the typical
unemployed individual, even when the latter group is restricted to job
seekers, we experimented to ﬁnd the most balanced matched sample
possible, while still retaining sufﬁcientmatched observations. This result-
ed in a strict calliper of 0.00025 being chosen, and in the one-to-one
matching, common support was not found for 2415 of the 6424 treated
individuals, who were therefore dropped from the analysis.
Despite efforts to determine themost balanced sample possible, there
remain some statistically signiﬁcant differences in the characteristics of
the W2W participants and the QLFS respondents in the control group
after the matching process.16 In particular the W2W group has higher
proportions in the 16–19 year old (9.0% versus 6.9%) and 45–49 year
old (10.6% versus 8.7%) age groups and a lower proportion in the 50–
54 year old age group (8.2% versus 10.5%), a higher proportion who are
male (47.3% versus 42.8%) and lower proportionswho are from an ethnic
minority (10.6% versus 12.3%) and who are single parents (22.3% versus15 In some respects, the QLFS job-seekers are actually less like the W2W participants
than the full QLFS sample. This is particularly noticeable for education, with the lack of
qualiﬁcations amongst the W2W participants even more noticeable when compared to
only job-seekers.
16 Themeanvalues for all explanatory variableswithin thematched dataset, with tests of
signiﬁcance of the differences between treatment and control groups, are presented in
Table A2 in the Appendix.24.8%), a higher proportion with musculoskeletal (20.5% versus 18.6%)
and a lower proportion with respiratory (2.2% versus 3.1%) health
problems.17 Furthermore, the W2W participants are more likely to have
shorter current unemployment spells and are less likely to be in receipt
of beneﬁts. Most of these differences favour the W2W group in terms of
the probability of ﬁnding work. However, these differences in observable
characteristics in thematched sample are small. Only 2 differences, out of
the 36 variables, have a standardised % bias of over 10%, and most are
below 5%.18 Fig. 1 shows the % bias for each explanatory variable both in
the raw (unmatched) andmatched samples, while Fig. 2 shows the histo-
gram of the biases across all variables, again for the two samples.19 It is
clear that thematching procedure has produced a substantiallymore bal-
anced comparison between treatment and control groups, compared to
the raw (unmatched) sample. The mean (median) standardized bias be-
fore matching was 16.4% (10.8%), while after matching it is just 4.1%
(3.4%). In a probit regression of the treatment indicator variable against
all of the explanatory variables, if the treatment and control groups are
similar in terms of their observable characteristics, then this regression
should have no explanatory power. The pseudo R2 in this regression
was 0.30 on the raw data sample, but just 0.02 on thematched data sam-
ple, while the LR statistic for the joint insigniﬁcance of all of the explana-
tory variables fell from 3427 to 238 when the matched sample was used.
Although the treatment and control groups are not perfectly balanced,
these results suggest a strong similarity in the observable characteristics
of the treatment and control groups, andwe therefore proceed to evaluate
the W2W programme with this matched dataset.
Table 2 contains the core results of the evaluation, presenting the im-
pact of W2W participation on the probability of moving into work, esti-
mated using the PSMprocedure described above. In each case, the results
from the two types of matching procedures are presented, namely one-
to-one (nearest neighbour) and kernel matching.
Theﬁrst panel in Table 2 considers the fullW2Wand job-seekingQLFS
samples. The ﬁrst row of results concerns movement into any employ-
ment at any point, regardless of type of job and duration. The results
show that those who participated in W2W are 8 percentage points
more likely to move into employment than similar job-seekers from the
QLFS control group. Recalling that the control group is restricted to QLFS
respondents who did not live in a W2W pilot area, this means that indi-
viduals in theW2W pilot areas who were looking to move back into em-
ployment and participated in the W2W programme were 8 percentage
points more likely to ﬁnd work than observationally similar individuals
who were also looking for employment but did not live inW2W pilot re-
gions and so could not participate. TheW2W effect can therefore be seen
as being over and above the effect of all othermethods available nationally
to help the unemployed back intowork. This effect is both statistically and
economically signiﬁcant. Given that the average likelihood ofmoving into
work in the sample is only around 30%, this impact of theW2Wscheme is
considerable. It is also very similar in size to the estimated effects of other
active labour market policies such as Pathways to Work and the NDYP.
One possibility to explain their higher rate of moving into work is
thatW2Wparticipantsmight be accepting jobs of lower quality. Two in-
dicators of job quality that are available, other than wages which are
considered later, are whether or not the job acquired is full-time,20
and whether or not the job acquired is permanent, or temporary andsquare root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).
19 Figs. 1 and 2 were created using the graph and hist options on the pstest command,
part of the psmatch2 command in Stata.
20 A full-time job is deﬁned as 30 hours or more per week. Of course, part-time work
need not be a signal of lower quality. A part-time job may have been actively desired by
some individuals, particularly amongst those just getting over long-term health or disabil-
ity problems, who compromise a large proportion of the W2W participants.
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640 J. Lindley et al. / Economic Modelling 51 (2015) 635–645time-limited in someway. Gannon and Roberts (2011) for example ﬁnd
that older workers with health problems in Britain are less likely to
work full-time. The second and third rows in each panel of Table 2 con-
sider these two possibilities in turn. The results show a larger W2W ef-
fect on the probability of obtaining a permanent job than obtaining any
job, with W2W participants being 10–11 percentage points more likely
to acquire a permanent job than QLFS job-seekers. There is therefore no
evidence that W2W is placing participants into casual jobs, in order to
increase re-employment rates. When the analysis focuses on full-time
jobs only, the results are very similar to those for ‘any jobs’, with
W2W participants being 8 percentage points more likely to move into
full-time work than job-seekers in the QLFS.21
A potential caveat with the results presented so far is that W2W par-
ticipants are potentially observed for longer than QLFS respondents, and
that this might explain their apparent higher likelihood of ﬁnding work.
Individuals respond to the QLFS for ﬁve successive quarters, meaning
that respondents in the QLFS control group are observed for a maximum
of 15 months. W2W participants, however, are observed joining the
scheme any time between the beginning of 2005 and the end of 2007,
and so could be observed for considerably longer than 15 months, thus
giving themmore time to be observed ﬁnding a job, relative to the QLFS
out-of-work respondents. Thus, a new dependent variable was created
to take the value of 1 if theW2Wparticipant obtained a jobwithin amax-
imum of 15 months of joining the scheme. Anyone who obtained a job
through W2W, but took longer than 15 months to do so was regarded
as being unsuccessful, on the basis of this new variable. In actual fact,
this meant that the analysis was now loaded against the W2W partici-
pants, who if they joined the scheme in 2007 (45% of the W2W sample)
were observed for fewer than 12 months, whereas the individuals in
the QLFS control group are observed for a minimum of 12 months.22
The second panel in Table 2 shows the results of this analysis. The
impact of W2W on the employment probability is very similar to that
estimated in theﬁrst panel, showing an estimated effect of 7 percentage
points (compared to 8 percentage points in the uncensored sample).2321 We further attempted to examine the permanence ofW2W jobs via a postal survey, in
February 2008, of all 804 participants who had found work by the end of 2006. The re-
sponse rate was only 16% (131/804). Of these respondents, 72% reported that they had
worked in the previous week, and of these, 73% were in the same job that they found
through W2W. The representativeness of these respondents might be questioned, but
the results suggest a good degree of permanence in the jobs found. Further details can
be found in Lindley et al. (2010).
22 We experimented with including a ‘time entered programme’ variable. Almost half of
W2W respondents joined in the last year (2007); when we control for the fact that they
did not have long to ﬁnd a job, the estimated ‘W2W’ effects are increased. If anything,
the estimates presented below are therefore under-estimates.
23 This similarity is because of the 1917 respondents who obtained a job all but 69 did so
within 15 months.This estimate is the most conservative estimate produced in the paper,
taking account of as many differences between treatment and control
groups as possible, and so is our preferred result.
Similarly, the estimatedW2Weffects forﬁnding a permanent or full-
time jobwhen given amaximum of 15months to do so, are very similar
to the uncensored results in the ﬁrst panel, with falls of only around one
percentage point in the probability of ﬁnding a permanent job, and one-
half a percentage point in the probability of ﬁnding a full-time job.
The analyses in the third and fourth panels of Table 2 repeat the anal-
yses of the ﬁrst two panels, but restrict the sample to those on IB only;
these were the original target group of the W2W scheme, and an impor-
tant aspect of the scheme is the availability of health care professionals to
provide advice and support to help IB-recipients overcome their difﬁcul-
ties andﬁnd suitablework. Itmight be expected, therefore, that ifW2W is
successful in helping people into employment, it will be most successful
for this group. The results in the lower 2 panels conﬁrm that this is indeed
the case, with all estimated marginal effects being substantially larger
than their equivalents in the upper two panels. Thus, the ﬁrst row in the
third panel shows that W2W participants who are in receipt of IB are
15 percentage points more likely to move into employment than job-
seeking IB-recipients with similar characteristics in the control group.
When only movements into jobs within 15 months of registering for
W2Ware considered, for compatibility reasonswith the QLFS,W2Wpar-
ticipants originally in receipt of IB are still 13 percentage pointsmore like-
ly to ﬁnd a job than their equivalents in the QLFS (panel 4, row 1). The
impact ofW2Won ﬁnding permanent and full-time jobs is similarly larg-
er for IB recipients only than for the full out-of-work population.
Table 3 considers whether W2W participants who ﬁnd work earn
more or less than their control group participants, adopting the same
twomethods ofmatching as used above. Since thewage data are banded,
the midpoints of the bands are used, and then logged.24 Estimates are24 For the open-ended top category (£30,000+), the value assigned to individuals is
1.5 ∗ lower bound, i.e., £45,000. So few participants achieve a wage in this band, that the
results are not signiﬁcantly affected if this value is changed.
Table 2
Propensity score estimates of W2W participation effect on probability of moving into
work.
Full sample
Propensity score
(one to one)
Propensity score
(kernel)
N
Any job 0.075** 0.083** 9299
(0.018) (0.015)
Permanent job 0.109** 0.104** 9207
(0.017) (0.016)
Full-time job 0.079** 0.082** 9299
(0.016) (0.010)
On Want2Work scheme b 15 months
Propensity score
(one to one)
Propensity score
(Kernel)
N
Any job† 0.065** 0.073** 9299
(0.019) (0.016)
Permanent job 0.100** 0.095** 9207
(0.017) (0.015)
Full-time job 0.074** 0.077** 9299
(0.014) (0.009)
IB recipients only
Propensity score
(one to one)
Propensity score
(Kernel)
N
Any job 0.147** 0.150** 4667
(0.030) (0.022)
Permanent job 0.148** 0.156** 4660
(0.028) (0.025)
Full-time job 0.097** 0.113** 4667
(0.023) (0.014)
IB recipients only and on Want2Work scheme b 15 months
Propensity score
(one to one)
Propensity score
(Kernel)
N
Any job 0.131** 0.134** 4667
(0.031) (0.021)
Permanent job 0.137** 0.143** 4660
(0.027) (0.022)
Full-time job 0.088** 0.104** 4667
(0.022) (0.015)
Notes: †denotes our preferred result. ** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. * statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Matching variables are those listed in Table A2.
Table 3
Propensity score estimates of W2W participation effect on earnings.
Propensity score (one2one) Propensity score (Kernel) N
Full sample −0.026 −0.003 2578
(0.051) (0.037)
IB only −0.043 −0.033 1134
(0.144) (0.085)
Notes: matching variables are those listed in Table A2.
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mated coefﬁcients are negative but none approach statistical signiﬁcance,
and this has two probable causes. First, sample sizes are small, with only
1884W2Wparticipantsﬁndingwork and having non-missingwage data.
Second, and in particular, there are only ﬁve wage bands in the data, and
as shown in Table 1b, over half of those who ﬁnd work are in the ﬁrst
band, so there is little variation in earnings to explain.
Recall from above that both full-time and part-time workers are
included in the analysis of wages. W2W respondents are more likely
to ﬁnd a full-time job than QLFS respondents,25 and so are likely to
have higher weekly wages for this reason.When the analysis is restrict-
ed to full-time workers, the size of the negative coefﬁcients in Table 3
are increased, but they remain statistically insigniﬁcant.26 An interesting ﬁnding whenmatching on age group and then performing PSMwithin
each age group is that the estimated treatment effect is actually negative in the youngest4.3. Robustness checks of PSM results
In this section,we estimate further speciﬁcations, to check the robust-
ness of the results to various modiﬁcations. The preferred speciﬁcation
from the previous section (where theW2W treatment group is restricted
to ﬁnding work within 15 months, to maintain comparability with the25 Of theW2W respondents who found a job, 58% were working full-time, compared to
42% for the QLFS.QLFS control group, and the outcome variable is ﬁnding any job) is used
as an example. If the various robustness checks described below are car-
ried out on other estimates fromTable 2, the same robustness of results is
observed, but they are not reported here for reasons of space.
First, the one-to-one matching results were checked for robustness
to variation in the calliper used. As described in the previous section, a
very strict calliper was used, as this produced the best result in terms
of the balancing property of thematched treatment and control groups.
As was seen, this resulted in a large number of observations being
dropped due to falling outside the area of common support. Table 4
shows that as the calliper is gradually relaxed, fewer observations
are lost for being off the common support. However, the estimated
treatment effect of W2W is largely unaffected, remaining positive and
signiﬁcant. It actually increases from the base result of a 6.5 percentage
point effect (from Table 2 and repeated in the ﬁrst row of Table 4) to an
8 percentage point effect with the wider calliper, though the change in
the treatment effect is not signiﬁcant.
The next check involved a variation in the matching process to try to
ensure bettermatches, whereby individuals in the treatment and control
groupwereﬁrstmatched exactly according to one key characteristic, and
then propensity score matching was used to match individuals across
other characteristicswithin each category of theﬁrst variable. The overall
treatment effect was then a weighted average of the treatment effects
across all categories of the ﬁrst variable. The key characteristics chosen
to be exactly matched were age group, qualiﬁcation level and type of ill-
ness/disability. The analysis had to be undertaken by exactly matching
on each of these variables in turn, cell sizes being too small to consider
every combination of the three variables. The resulting overall treatment
effects, again for the preferred speciﬁcation of any jobwithin amaximum
period of 15months, were 9.9 percentage points whenmatching exactly
on age group,26 4.6 percentage points whenmatching on highest qualiﬁ-
cation and 6.0 percentage points when matching on type of illness/
disability. The effects therefore remain positive and strong.
Table A2 and the discussion in the previous sectionmade it clear that
although thematching process greatly reduces the differences between
the treatment and control groups, some differences remain even after
matching. To allow for this less than perfectmatching, a further amend-
ment is to take the matched samples of treated and control individuals,
and rather than simply compare the mean values of the outcome
variables in the two groups, estimate a regression on the matched
samples, thus controlling for any remaining differences in observable
characteristics between matched treatment and control groups. The
results are shown in Table 5.
The ﬁrst two rows of Table 5 provide, for comparison purposes,
estimated regression results on the unmatched samples. Since the de-
pendent variable is a dummy variable, whether or not the individual
ﬁnds a job within 15 months, the estimated equation is a probit, with
Table 5 reporting the marginal effects on the W2W treatment variable.
For the unmatched samplewith no control variables, thismarginal effect
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This is analogous to the raw data
in Table 1 showing that theW2W sample is less likely to ﬁnd work thantwo age groups, before turning positive and becoming larger with age for the remaining
age groups. TheW2W programme therefore seems to beneﬁt older workers in particular,
who perhaps ﬁnd it harder to return to employment without assistance.
Table 4
Impact of varying the calliper: one-to-one matching, outcome variable ‘get any job’, Indi-
viduals on Want2Work scheme restricted to b15 months (i.e., preferred speciﬁcation in
Table 2).
Calliper Number of observations
off common support (%)
Number of
observations used
Estimated treatment
effect of Want2Work
0.00025 2415 (37.6%) 6884 0.065 (0.019)**
0.0005 999 (15.6%) 8300 0.074 (0.017)**
0.001 204 (3.2%) 9095 0.080 (0.018)**
0.005 1 (0.002%) 9298 0.080 (0.021)**
Note: ** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Matching variables are those listed in Table A2.
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ables are added to control for differences in characteristics between the
two groups, then the estimated treatment effect turns positive but is sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant. Row 3 shows a further increase in the estimated
treatment effect when using thematched sample, thus no longer includ-
ing those treated individuals whose characteristics mean that they ﬁnd
no match in the control group. The fact that the treatment effect in-
creases, relative to the unmatched sample results, shows that the treated
individuals lying outside the area of common support are those whose
characteristics make it particularly difﬁcult for them to ﬁnd work. Once
control variables are added to the probit equation on the matched sam-
ple (row 4), to control for any remaining differences between treatment
and control groups after matching, the effect of W2W is once again esti-
mated to be positive and signiﬁcant, at a 3.7 percentage point increase in
the probability of ﬁnding work within 15 months.
The ﬁnal row in Table 5 shows the estimated treatment effect when
the probit equation estimated on the matched sample is further reﬁned
byusingweights, with theweights provided by the kernel PSM showing
the average closeness of each control observation to the treated obser-
vations, and are thus an indicator of the quality of the observation in
the matching process. It can be seen that in this speciﬁcation, our pre-
ferred probit speciﬁcation, the effect ofW2W is to increase the probabil-
ity of employment within 15 months by 5.3 percentage points. Thus,
using probit regression analysis after matching to further control for re-
maining differences between treatment and control groups reduces the
impact of W2W from 6.5 percentage points (Table 2) to 5.3 percentage
points (Table 5), but the effect remains positive and signiﬁcant. The
small reduction in the estimated effect is due to the fact that in the
matched sample, the remaining differences in mean characteristics be-
tween treatment and control groups slightly favoured the treatment
group in terms of ﬁnding work (see discussion of Table A2 above),
and so controlling for these differences in the probit equation reduces
the estimated treatment effect by a small amount.
Finally in this section, the analysis of earnings for those who ﬁnd
work can be similarly extended, by estimating a regression equation
on the matched sample identiﬁed by the PSM analysis. As with the em-
ployment equations, this allows for any remaining differences between
the treatment and control groups after matching to be controlled for.
Using a regression-based estimator also allows us to take account ofTable 5
Probit equations for ﬁnding a job within 15 months, various speciﬁcations.
Speciﬁcation Estimated
treatment effect
Number of
observations
Unmatched samples, no control variables −0.032 (0.010)** 9801
Unmatched samples, with control variables 0.016 (0.012) 9299
Matched samples, no control variables 0.022 (0.015) 5269
Matched samples, with control variables 0.037 (0.015)* 5269
Matched samples, weighted, with control
variables
0.053 (0.015)** 5269
Notes: reported treatment effect is the estimated marginal effect derived from the probit
coefﬁcients. ** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. * statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level.
Control variables are those listed in Table A2.the grouped nature of the earnings variable, by estimating an interval
regression model (see Stewart, 1983). This model is a Maximum Likeli-
hoodmethod, taking account of the earnings interval in which each ob-
servation falls, and the upper and lower earnings limits of that interval,
to produce a point estimate for each coefﬁcient to indicate the condi-
tional difference in earnings. The W2W coefﬁcient in this second stage
regression is−0.027 (standard error 0.050). An alternative to the inter-
val regression is an ordered probit regression, taking account of just the
earnings interval into which each observation falls, again estimated on
thematched sample with weights obtained from the PSM. Fig. 3 graphs
the predicted probability of an individual, with mean characteristics,
falling into each earnings interval, separately for the treatment and con-
trol group. The difference between the two predicted probabilities is
therefore the marginal effect of the W2W treatment on the probability
of falling within each earnings interval. As can be seen, all of thesemar-
ginal effects are small, and all are statistically insigniﬁcant.27 All analyses
on the earnings data therefore tell the same story, that there is no
signiﬁcant difference in earnings between the W2W participants and
the control group respondents who ﬁnd a job.
4.4. Differences in re-employment rates prior to the introduction of W2W
Most of the previous studies summarised in the literature reviewhave
adopted a DiD framework to evaluate active labour market policies. This
approachwas not adopted here, since the detailed database onW2Wpar-
ticipants does not contain information covering the period before they
joined W2W, and so could not be used in a DiD framework. However, as
a robustness check on the results, and to mirror the methodologies used
in other papers, we also conducted a comparison of employment out-
comes in the W2W pilot and non-pilot areas, both before and after
W2Wwas introduced, using QLFS in a DiD approach. Looking ﬁrst at the
period before W2W was introduced, a comparison of re-employment
probabilities between the areas that would become W2W pilot areas
and those that would not, reveals whether those individuals who lived
inW2Wareas always had a higher re-employment rate, perhaps because
of a particular feature of the local labour market for example.
QLFS data with a local area indicator at a sufﬁciently disaggregated
level are available from 2003. Since the W2W pilot programme began
in September 2004, we use data up to the second quarter of 2004 (i.e.,
up to June 2004). If we wanted to follow individuals for all ﬁve quarters
in which they participate in the QLFS, then this meant only two cohorts
of respondents could be followed. This produced too few out of work
job-seekers in the W2W areas for feasible analysis, however. Therefore
we restrict the analysis to three quarters of QLFS data, considering indi-
viduals out of work but seeking work in one quarter, and looking to see
whether they move into work in the subsequent two quarters. This
allowed us to follow six cohorts of respondents.
The local area indicator is used to determinewhether or not individ-
uals live in an area that will become aW2Wpilot area.28 The same anal-
ysis as used in the previous section is repeated, estimating thedifference
in the likelihood of job-seekers moving into work when comparing
(future) W2W and non-W2W areas. PSM is again used, matching on ex-
actly the same list of characteristics. The results show a higher rate of
moving into a job in the areas that will becomeW2W pilot areas, though
the difference is highly statistically insigniﬁcant. The estimated effect
(standard error) is 0.020 (0.101) when using one-to-one matching.29 A
similar analysis was then undertaken for the W2W period, but again27 The estimated marginal effects for theW2W treatment for the ﬁve earnings intervals
are (standard errors in parentheses): Interval 1−0.054 (0.053); Interval 2 0.027 (0.027);
Interval 3 0.017 (0.016); Interval 4 0.003 (0.003); Interval 5 0.007 (0.007).
28 Only those individuals who remain in that area throughout the 3 quarters they were
observed were included.
29 Unfortunately it was not possible to do a similar pre-W2W exercise for IB claimants
only. Every job-seeking IB claimant in the QLFS in W2W areas before W2W began failed
to move into a job within three quarters.
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643J. Lindley et al. / Economic Modelling 51 (2015) 635–645using QLFS data, rather than theW2Wdatabase used in the previous sec-
tion. As with the pre-W2W period, the cohorts were again followed for
three quarters, in order to make a fair comparison. The results therefore
produce the ‘intention to treat’ estimator, based on individuals selected
for potential treatment (by virtue of living in aWamt2Work area) though
not necessarily actually treated (in terms of participating in W2W). The
results show a W2W effect on moving into employment of 0.049
(0.113). This is again insigniﬁcantly different from zero, and so also insig-
niﬁcantly different from the pre-W2W effect. This however is due to the
large standard errors in turn causedby small numbers of on support treat-
ed observations (i.e., few people in the pilot areas in the QLFS who were
initially out of work but looking for work). In terms of the point estimate,
it has increased 2.5 times froma2percentage point effect to a 4.9 percent-
age point effectwhich is at least supportive of the positive effect observed
for W2W in the main analysis above.30 The DiD estimate is therefore 2.9
percentage points, calculated as:
dDiD ¼ ET1−EC1
 
− ET0−E
C
0
 
where E is the estimated re-employment rate, the T andC superscripts de-
note treatment and control groups and the 0 and 1 subscripts denote pre-
and post-W2W periods, respectively.
5. Summary and conclusion
TheW2Wpilot schemewas aimed at helping beneﬁt recipients, pri-
marily those receiving IB, back into employment, using a range of advice
and incentivemechanisms. By using PSM to compareW2Wparticipants
with similar job-seekers in non-W2W regions we were able to evaluate
the success of the W2W programme.
The evidence produced is convincing, and supportive of W2W.
Using a range of estimation methods, different sub-samples, and dif-
ferent types of job, the W2W participants consistently come out as
being more likely to move into employment, compared to individ-
uals in the control group. Such an advantage was not observed in
the W2W areas before the programme was introduced. The size of
the programme effect varies according to the speciﬁcation being
considered, but is always statistically signiﬁcant. Our preferred30 TheW2Weffect of 5 percentage points using theQLFSdata is less than theW2Weffect
of 8 percentage points using theW2Wdatabase. Themain results using the database esti-
mated an average treatment effect for individuals actually treated by the programme. The
QLFS results, on the other hand, estimates only an ‘intention to treat’ effect, on individuals
who were eligible for treatment (though not all will have actually been treated).speciﬁcation is the most conservative one; allowing W2W partici-
pants a maximum of 15 months to ﬁnd a job (as this is the longest
that we can observe individuals in the control group), and comparing
them to out-of-work QLFS respondents who say that they actually
want a job and are looking for a job, but do not live in the W2W
pilot areas and so could not participate in the programme. The re-
sults show that the W2W participants are 7 percentage points
more likely to move into employment than those observationally-
similar individuals looking for work in non-pilot areas, showing the
beneﬁt of W2W over and above the standard help on offer to the un-
employed. Given that only around 30 percent of jobseekers across
the two datasets obtained a job, this W2W effect is sizeable. The
size of this effect is very similar to the estimated effects of other ac-
tive labour market policies, such as the 5 percentage point effect on
employment of the New Deal for Young People, as estimated by
both Blundell et al. (2004) and De Giorgi (2005).
The original target of W2W was individuals in receipt of IB, and
the programme was tailored to help that group in particular, for ex-
ample through the involvement of health professionals. When the
treatment and control groups are restricted to those individuals ini-
tially in receipt of IB, the estimated employment impact of W2W in-
creases to around 13 percentage points, against a base of 25 percent
of IB claimants moving into employment within 15 months. The size
of this effect compares very favourably with the Pathways to Work
scheme, for which researchers have found employment effects of
7–9 percentage points using parametric methodology (Adam et al.,
2006; Bewley et al., 2007).
As well as considering simply whether a job is obtained, the analysis
also provided some evidence as to the quality of jobs being obtained. In
terms of the type of job accepted, the results are not changed greatly
when the focus is restricted to only full-time or permanent jobs, though
the W2W effect is slightly weaker for obtaining full-time work than for
obtaining any job in the case of former IB claimants. Even in this case,
however, theW2W effect compared to the control group is strongly pos-
itive. In terms of earnings, there is some evidence thatW2W participants
accept lower wage jobs than members of the control group, though this
difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, there is nothing to sug-
gest that the success of W2W in terms of getting people into work can
be explained by a greaterwillingness to push clients into lowquality jobs.
Finally, on a methodological note, this paper shows how evalua-
tions of labour market policies can be undertaken, even when
policy-makers have not collected data on a control group of non-
participants, or on participants before involvement, thus ruling out
DiD techniques. Data from national surveys such as Labour Force
Surveys can be used to obtain a sample of individuals in non-policy
areas, who can then be matched to programme participants using
PSM techniques, to ensure the employment probabilities of similar
individuals are being compared. Such non-parametric techniques
have additional advantages over more traditional evaluation tech-
niques, in that they do not impose functional form, and identify
any individual for whom there is a lack of common support. Howev-
er, these techniques should be seen as a fall-back position, to be re-
served for situations when a control group has not been established
as part of the design. A properly controlled prospective evaluation is
still to be preferred.Acknowledgements
This work was produced for the National Assembly for Wales, con-
tract number 130/2006. All views expressed are those of the authors,
and not necessarily those of the National Assembly. The Labour Force
Survey data used in the report were made available by the UK Data Ser-
vice. The database of information onW2Wparticipantswas provided by
the Welsh Assembly Government. We thank two anonymous referees
and the editor for very useful comments.
644 J. Lindley et al. / Economic Modelling 51 (2015) 635–645Appendix ATable A1
Sample means for Want2Work participants and QLFS respondents (unmatched samples).
Want2Work participants
(treated)
QLFS
(control group)
QLFS — seeking work only
(control group)
Difference W2W — QLFS Difference W2W — QLFS
seeking
Age 16–19 0.077 0.050 0.079 0.027** −0.002
Age 20–24 0.149 0.066 0.086 0.083** 0.062**
Age 25–29 0.144 0.071 0.085 0.073** 0.059**
Age 30–34 0.123 0.096 0.105 0.028** 0.018**
Age 35–39 0.137 0.115 0.122 0.021** 0.014*
Age 40–44 0.130 0.109 0.123 0.021** 0.007
Age 45–49 0.102 0.100 0.103 0.002 −0.001
Age 50–54 0.073 0.112 0.107 −0.039** −0.034**
Age 55–59 0.052 0.165 0.113 −0.113** −0.061**
Age 60 plus 0.014 0.116 0.076 −0.102** −0.062**
Highest qualiﬁcation: NQF5 0.041 0.090 0.105 −0.049** −0.064**
Highest qualiﬁcation: NQF4 0.019 0.053 0.051 −0.033** −0.031**
Highest qualiﬁcation: NQF3 0.093 0.160 0.178 −0.067** −0.085**
Highest qualiﬁcation: NQF2 0.195 0.224 0.243 −0.029** −0.047**
Highest qualiﬁcation: NQF1 0.154 0.137 0.155 0.017** −0.001
No qualiﬁcations 0.498 0.336 0.269 0.162** 0.229**
Male 0.493 0.342 0.440 0.151** 0.053**
Illness: cardio 0.026 0.120 0.109 −0.095** −0.083**
Illness: learning 0.017 0.032 0.030 −0.015** −0.013**
Illness: mental health 0.249 0.081 0.072 0.167** 0.177**
Illness: musculoskeletal 0.193 0.204 0.186 −0.011 0.007
Illness: other 0.126 0.106 0.095 0.021** 0.031**
Illness: respiratory 0.019 0.052 0.057 −0.033** −0.038**
Illness: none 0.371 0.405 0.450 −0.034** −0.079**
Single parent 0.211 0.152 0.192 0.059** 0.019*
Non-white 0.099 0.117 0.111 −0.018** −0.012
Never worked 0.053 0.151 0.122 −0.098** −0.068**
Last worked 0–6 months ago 0.208 0.101 0.192 0.107** 0.016
Last worked 6–12 months ago 0.108 0.059 0.089 0.050** 0.019**
Last worked 12–24 months ago 0.118 0.085 0.114 0.033** 0.004
Last worked 2–5 years ago 0.257 0.169 0.162 0.088** 0.095**
Last worked 6–10 years ago 0.148 0.194 0.164 −0.046** −0.016*
Last worked 11–15 years ago 0.072 0.110 0.088 −0.038** −0.016**
Last worked 16–20 years ago 0.018 0.056 0.036 −0.038** −0.018**
Last worked more than 20 years ago 0.018 0.075 0.033 −0.058** −0.015**
Regional unemployment rate 0.059 0.049 0.050 0.010** 0.010**
IB in ﬁrst period 0.597 0.335 0.256 0.262** 0.342**
Income support in ﬁrst period 0.191 0.091 0.107 0.100** 0.084**
Other beneﬁt in ﬁrst period 0.022 0.075 0.160 −0.053** −0.139**
No beneﬁt in ﬁrst period 0.190 0.516 0.495 −0.326** −0.305**
Note: QLFS is the GB Quarterly Labour Force Survey.
Table A2
Mean values of explanatory variables within the matched treatment and control groups.
Matched Want2Work
participants (treated)
Matched QLFS — seeking
work only (control group)
Standardised
% bias
Differences in means between matched
treatment and control groups
Age 16–19 0.091 0.069 8.1 0.022**
Age 20–24 0.132 0.125 2.3 0.007
Age 25–29 0.127 0.124 1.0 0.003
Age 30–34 0.117 0.111 2.0 0.006
Age 35–39 0.137 0.137 0.0 0.000
Age 40–44 0.129 0.134 −1.4 −0.005
Age 45–49 0.106 0.087 6.0 0.019**
Age 50–54 0.082 0.105 −7.6 −0.023**
Age 55–59 0.063 0.073 −3.5 −0.010
Highest qualiﬁcation: NQF5 0.045 0.039 2.4 0.006
Highest qualiﬁcation: NQF4 0.024 0.018 3.3 0.006
Highest qualiﬁcation: NQF3 0.107 0.096 3.4 0.011
Highest qualiﬁcation: NQF2 0.210 0.208 0.5 0.002
Highest qualiﬁcation: NQF1 0.156 0.151 1.2 0.005
Male 0.473 0.428 9.1 0.045**
Illness: cardio 0.032 0.038 −2.4 −0.006
Illness: learning 0.019 0.016 1.5 0.003
Illness: mental health 0.201 0.191 2.8 0.010
Illness: musculoskeletal 0.205 0.186 4.7 0.019*
Illness: other 0.121 0.118 0.9 0.003
Illness: respiratory 0.022 0.031 −4.4 −0.009*
Table A2 (continued)
Matched Want2Work
participants (treated)
Matched QLFS — seeking
work only (control group)
Standardised
% bias
Differences in means between matched
treatment and control groups
Single parent 0.223 0.248 −6.4 −0.025**
Non-white 0.106 0.123 −5.6 −0.017*
Never worked 0.065 0.078 −4.7 −0.013*
Last worked 0–6 months ago 0.197 0.166 7.9 0.031**
Last worked 6–12 months ago 0.104 0.074 10.3 0.030**
Last worked 12–24 months ago 0.116 0.113 1.0 0.003
Last worked 2–5 years ago 0.238 0.251 −3.1 −0.013
Last worked 6–10 years ago 0.157 0.165 −2.2 −0.008
Last worked 11–15 years ago 0.082 0.104 −8.0 −0.022**
Last worked 16–20 years ago 0.020 0.022 −0.9 −0.002
Regional unemployment rate 0.059 0.059 −4.9 0.000*
IB in ﬁrst period 0.555 0.577 −4.8 −0.022*
Income support in ﬁrst period 0.194 0.236 −11.8 −0.042**
Other beneﬁt in ﬁrst period 0.027 0.041 −5.0 −0.014**
Notes: QLFS is the GB Quarterly Labour Force Survey. ** statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. * statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The standardised % bias is the difference in the samplemeans as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1985).
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